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THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS:  PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY 
ORGANIZATIONS’ ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING TO SUE 
KELSEY MCCOWAN HEILMAN †
INTRODUCTION
Popular discussion of the standing doctrine has reached a fever 
pitch.  A search for “standing to sue” in the New York Times archives for 
the last two years connects this phrase to a smorgasbord of hot politi-
cal issues:  global warming,1 warrantless wiretapping,2 torture,3 and 
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University.  I am deeply indebted to Jane Hudson, Senior Staff Attorney at the National 
Disability Rights Network, and Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and 
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ability Rights Network of Pennsylvania for her recommendations and refinements.  I 
also would like to thank the Board, Senior Editors, and Associate Editors of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review, particularly Jason Levine, Evan Mendelson, Miriam 
Nemeth, Julie Dohm, Erin Flynn, Christopher Fromherz, and Felicia Lin, for their 
thoughtful feedback and painstaking editing.  Finally, special thanks to my family, es-
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1 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to grant standing 
to a “broad coalition of states, cities and environmental groups” that challenged the 
EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases). 
2 See Adam Liptak, Spying Program May Be Tested by Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2007, at A1 (noting that the standing requirement in civil cases had made challenging 
the legality of an NSA surveillance program difficult). 
3 See Paul von Zielbauer, Former Detainees Argue for Right to Sue Rumsfeld over Torture,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at A9 (reporting on a federal court hearing that concerned 
“whether noncitizens confined in prisons outside the United States had legal standing 
to sue American military officials for constitutional violations”). 
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the separation of church and state.4  For a relatively young doctrine,5
standing is incredibly pervasive in popular as well as judicial discourse. 
This Comment explores the implications of the standing analysis 
for a particular group of plaintiffs:  Protection and Advocacy Organi-
zations (P&As)—a group of federally funded nonprofit corporations 
or state entities6 statutorily charged with protecting and advocating on 
behalf of individuals with disabilities.  P&As exist in all fifty states, 
Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, 
American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands.7  According to 
the National Disability Rights Network’s website, P&As 
have the authority to provide legal representation and other advocacy 
services, under all federal and state laws, to all people with disabilities 
(based on a system of priorities for services).  All P&As maintain a pres-
ence in facilities that care for people with disabilities, where they moni-
tor, investigate and attempt to remedy adverse conditions.  These agen-
cies also devote considerable resources to ensuring full access to 
inclusive educational programs, financial entitlements, healthcare, ac-
cessible housing and productive employment opportunities.
8
P&As engage in a variety of advocacy activities, though their pri-
orities differ across the country as they respond to local and state-
specific problems.  For example, in October 2008, Pennsylvania’s 
P&A, the Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania (DRN), focused 
on combating the bullying and harassment of children with disabili-
4 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Suit on Federal Money for Faith-Based Office,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A18 (explaining a Supreme Court decision holding that 
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality, under the Establish-
ment Clause, of White House expenditures). 
5 See infra note 59 (discussing the “constitutionalization” of the standing doctrine 
as a recent doctrinal development). 
6 For a discussion of possible implications of a state’s decision to charter its P&A as 
an independent government agency, rather than to contract out to a nonprofit, see 
infra note 152. 
7 See Letter from Curtis L. Decker, Executive Dir., Nat’l Disability Rights Network, 
to Patricia A. Morrissey, Comm’r, Admin. on Developmental Disabilities, Admin. for 
Children and Families 1 ( June 9, 2008), available at http://www.ndrn.org/regs/ 
NDRN-comments-on-proposed-DD-reg6-9-08.pdf. 
8 Nat’l Disability Rights Network, The P&A/CAP System, http://www.ndrn.org/ 
aboutus/PA_CAP.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).  The National Disability Rights Net-
work (NDRN) is the nonprofit membership organization of protection and advocacy 
systems and client assistance programs (CAPs) in the United States.  CAPs provide 
complimentary services to individuals with disabilities who are seeking vocational re-
habilitation under the Rehabilitation Act.  Id.  CAPs are beyond the scope of this 
Comment.
2008] The Rights of Others 239
ties in public schools.9  DRN’s website provided a variety of “Know 
Your Rights” publications and resources for parents and offered the 
opportunity to participate in a survey on the topic.  The Hawaii Dis-
ability Rights Center provides an example of a different type of advo-
cacy through its recently launched community television series on dis-
ability rights.10  The series features programming on emergency 
preparedness and other issues for individuals with disabilities and 
their families.  Disability Rights Oregon is currently investigating com-
plaints of maltreatment faced by individuals with mental disabilities in 
emergency rooms through an online questionnaire.11
These examples represent a very small slice of the advocacy in 
which P&As engage each day.  P&As also regularly meet with local, 
state, and national government officials, comment on proposed regu-
lations, and visit local facilities for individuals with disabilities.  Occa-
sionally, a P&A determines that litigation is the best way to advocate 
on behalf of state residents with disabilities.  However, courts of ap-
peals disagree over whether P&As have associational standing to sue 
on behalf of their constituents.12  This question is particularly impor-
tant for anyone concerned about disability rights, given that individu-
als with disabilities—especially those in institutions—face cognitive 
and social barriers to self-advocacy. 
The resolution of the associational standing issue for P&As has 
ramifications for other organizations as well.  Certain organizations—
such as unions and trade associations—clearly have associational 
standing, provided that they can demonstrate harm to one of their 
members and an issue central to their purposes as an organization.13
However, for other types of organizations, such as environmental 
groups, which may not have a dues-paying or voting membership in 
the traditional sense, standing poses a series of unanswered questions.  
To qualify for associational standing, does the organization have to be 
9 See Disability Rights Network of Pa., Bullying and Harassment in Pennsylvania 
Schools, http://www.drnpa.org/news/id/13 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (noting that the 
organization is in “the beginning stages of advocacy on the issue” and is seeking input 
from concerned individuals). 
10 See Haw. Disability Rights Ctr., HDRC Launches New Olelo Community Television 
Series ( July 23, 2007), http://www.hawaiidisabilityrights.org/General_NewsDetail.aspx? 
nid=1035.
11 See Disability Rights Or., OAC News and Reports, http://www.oradvocacy.org/news/ 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (soliciting accounts from emergency room visitors). 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 See infra text accompanying note 75. 
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long established, or can it be newly formed?14  Must the members vote 
or pay dues?15  Does membership have to be voluntary?16  A careful 
analysis of P&As’ associational standing is important beyond the dis-
abilities world; it also has the potential to inform decisions that other 
organizations make when constructing legal arguments for associa-
tional standing—and even when deciding how to structure their or-
ganizations in the first instance.17
When it comes to associational standing, the judicial inquiry is 
composed of two parts.  First, courts ask the constitutional question:  
whether the ties between the member or members and the association 
are tight enough to satisfy Article III’s core standing requirements of 
injury, causation, and redressability.18  Since individuals themselves 
cannot bring suit in federal court without meeting these three re-
quirements, associations must demonstrate a sufficiently close rela-
tionship to the members and their interests to gain standing by proxy.  
Second, courts are faced with the prudential inquiry:  whether an as-
sociation that is constitutionally qualified to sue on behalf of its mem-
bers should be granted an exception to the usual prudential limita-
tion that one person cannot sue on behalf of another.19  The doctrinal 
approach to associational standing, articulated in Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission, requires an organization to satisfy a 
14 Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 678, 690 (1973) (granting standing to “SCRAP[,] . . . ‘an unin-
corporated association formed by five law students . . . in September 1971’”), with Si-
erra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-41 (1972) (noting that plaintiff Sierra Club was 
“a large and long-established organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of 
protecting our Nation’s natural heritage from man’s depredations,” but denying stand-
ing on other grounds).
15 See Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary?  Organizational Standing and Non-Voting 
Members of Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 75-77, 80-81 
(2005) (analyzing the extent to which members’ voting rights and financial contribu-
tions tie organizations’ decisions to litigate to these members’ interests). 
16 See id. at 78-79 (analyzing the extent to which voluntary membership ties organi-
zations’ decisions to litigate to their members’ interests). 
17 Cf. id. at 81-87 (discussing “some of the . . . measures an organization may take 
to improve a claim for standing, while minimizing exposure to hostile takeover”); id. at 
70-75 (assessing environmental groups’ prospects for associational standing by drawing 
from federal court decisions about P&A associational standing). 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 56-61. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 65-70 (outlining the prudential standing re-
quirements that courts apply on top of the Constitution’s minimum standing require-
ments).
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three-prong test to establish standing.20  The test encompasses both 
the constitutional and prudential requirements.21
In Parts I and II of this Comment, I trace the history of P&As’ ena-
bling statutes and the Supreme Court’s standing and associational 
standing doctrines, paying particular attention to the goals underlying 
the standing test.  Part III introduces the approaches of the four 
courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue of associational standing 
for P&As.  Finally, Part IV applies the Hunt analysis, informed by the 
goals discussed in Part III, to P&As.  I argue that the procedural safe-
guards in place under P&A enabling statutes ensure a connection be-
tween P&As and their constituents, affirming the tight relationship be-
tween the claim and the organization necessary to provide zealous 
litigation and protect the separation of powers.  Therefore, Article III 
should not be construed to bar associational standing for P&As be-
cause these organizations will be litigating true Article III “controver-
sies.”  Furthermore, the P&A enabling statutes should be read as an 
abrogation by Congress of all prudential barriers to granting P&As as-
sociational standing.  Finally, the real-world risk of unaddressed rights 
violations if P&As are denied standing further supports an extension 
of the prudential doctrine of associational standing to include P&As. 
I. THE HISTORY AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF
PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS
In 1974, an advocacy group for children with disabilities success-
fully sued Willowbrook State School, a New York institution for people 
with developmental disabilities, for inhumane treatment of thousands 
of patients.22  In finding that the school had violated the patients’ 
20 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see also infra text accompanying note 75 (discussing 
Hunt’s three-part test). 
21 I discuss which of the Hunt requirements are constitutional, and thus immov-
able, and which are prudential, and thus able to be eliminated by Congress or the 
Court, infra Part IV.A-B. 
22 See N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Melissa Bowman, Note, Open Debate over Closed Doors:  The Effect 
of the New Developmental Disabilities Regulations on Protection and Advocacy Programs, 85 KY.
L.J. 955, 959-60 (1997) (citing Willowbrook’s watershed role in the history of the pro-
tection and advocacy system).  Willowbrook became notorious, largely due to Geraldo 
Rivera’s Peabody Award-winning exposé, Willowbrook:  The Last Great Disgrace (WABC 
television broadcast Jan. 6, 1972).  This exposé is available on the DVD of UNFORGOT-
TEN: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER WILLOWBROOK (City Lights International 1996).  Wil-
lowbrook was not, however, the only institution with such inhumane conditions.  
Rather, it was symptomatic of a nationwide problem.  See, e.g., The Big News with John 
Facenda:  Suffer the Little Children (NBC television broadcast 1968), available at
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“right to reasonable protection from harm,”23 the court noted “[t]he
loss of an eye, the breaking of teeth, the loss of part of an ear bitten 
off by another resident, and frequent bruises and scalp wounds were 
typical of the [residents’] testimony.”24  The true horrors of Willow-
brook are only hinted at in the court’s opinion; witnesses at the trial 
reported beatings, inappropriate use of restraints, untreated wounds, 
and even deliberate exposure to disease for the purpose of medical 
experimentation.25  In response to the situation at Willowbrook, Con-
gress passed the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act (the DD Act) of 1975.26  The DD Act offered federal fund-
ing to assist states in providing services to individuals with develop-
mental disabilities.  To be eligible for this funding, states were re-
quired to establish a system to “protect the legal and human rights of 
individuals with developmental disabilities.”27
In 2000, the DD Act was repealed and replaced with the Develop-
mental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (PADD).28
Between 1975 and 2000, the responsibility and authority of P&As had 
http://www.nbc10.com/videovault/4294108/detail.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) 
(exposing, in a five-part news series, the shocking conditions at Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital in Spring City, Pennsylvania, which housed individuals with cognitive im-
pairments and mental illnesses). 
23 Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. at 758. 
24 Id. at 756. 
25 Bowman, supra note 22, at 959. 
26 Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486; see also Bowman, supra note 22, at 959. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 15001(b)(2) (2000). 
28 Pub. L. No. 106-402, 114 Stat. 1677 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001–15115 
(2000)).  This replacement is often also referred to as the “DD Act,” but the portion 
that authorizes the protection and advocacy system, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041–15045, is 
known as PADD.  In his signing statement, President Clinton discussed the evolution 
of the law from 1974 to 2000: 
 When [the DD Act] was first conceived . . . , the primary emphasis was on 
the advancement of scientific understanding, professional education, and en-
suring access to, and safety of, institutional facilities . . . . Today, the programs 
emphasize fundamental system change, including legal services and advocacy 
and capacity-building at the State and local levels. The focus is on listening to 
people with developmental disabilities as self-advocates, and helping people 
with developmental disabilities and their families obtain the information, as-
sistive technology, and supports they need to make more informed choices 
about how and where to live.  An important aspect of today’s work is to ensure 
self-determination and access to supports for historically unserved and under-
served populations across the Nation.  To ensure continued progress in these 
areas, [PADD] now includes performance-based accountability requirements. 
Statement on Signing the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
of 2000, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2382, 2383 (Oct. 30, 2000). 
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been expanded by two major pieces of federal legislation:  the Protec-
tion and Advocacy of Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986 (PAIMI)29
brought people with mental illness under the protection of P&As, 
while the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act of 1992 
(PAIR)30 filled in the gaps and inclusively covered all individuals with 
disabilities not yet covered by PADD or PAIMI.  Collectively, these 
three statutes grant a state’s P&A the powers to investigate allegations 
of abuse and neglect, respond to rights violations, and provide general 
advocacy services on behalf of state residents with disabilities or men-
tal illness.31
29 Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801–
10851 (2000)).  What was then referred to as the PAMII program has since been re-
named the Protection and Advocacy of Individuals with Mental Illness program, with 
the new acronym PAIMI.  See Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 
§ 3206, 114 Stat. 1101, 1193-94 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10801 note).  This change re-
flects a preference in the disability community for “people-first” language that con-
ceives of disabilities as attributional rather than definitional.  See National Service In-
clusion Project, Glossary of Disability and National Service Related Terms, 
http://www.serviceandinclusion.org/index.php?page=glossary#language (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2008). 
30 Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4430 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794e 
(2000)).  Throughout this Comment, PADD and PAIMI are cited along with the regu-
lations promulgated under them, which are codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 1385–1387 
(2007) and 42 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2007), respectively.  PAIR is not cited because it was 
drafted to fill in the gaps left by PADD and PAIMI: 
 The purpose of this section is to . . . protect the legal and human rights of 
individuals with disabilities who . . . are ineligible for protection and advocacy 
programs under [PADD] because the individuals do not have a developmen-
tal disability, as defined in . . . [the] Act; and are ineligible for services under 
[PAIMI] because the individuals are not individuals with mental illness, as de-
fined in . . . [the] Act. 
29 U.S.C. § 794e(a)(1).  PAIR grants the “same general authorities, including access to 
records and program income, as are set forth in [PADD]; [and] the authority to pur-
sue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the 
protection of, and advocacy for, the rights of individuals described in subsection (a)(1) 
of this section.”  Id. § 794e(f)(2)–(3).  As such, a discussion of authority under PADD 
amounts to a discussion of authority under PAIR. 
31 As a result of these three programs’ superior funding, the vast bulk of P&A work 
is done under the authority of PADD, PAIMI, and PAIR.  There are, however, actually 
eight total P&A programs.  Those not discussed in this Comment are the Client Assis-
tance Program, 29 U.S.C. § 732 (2000) (granting P&A services to individuals receiving 
or seeking state rehabilitative services); Protection and Advocacy for Assistive Technol-
ogy, 29 U.S.C. § 3004 (Supp. IV 2004) (extending P&A funding to allow assistance for 
individuals with disabilities seeking assistive technology); Protection and Advocacy for 
Beneficiaries of Social Security, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-21 (Supp. IV 2004) (providing em-
ployment assistance to recipients of Social Security); Protection and Advocacy for Indi-
viduals with Traumatic Brain Injury, 42 U.S.C. § 300d-53 (2000) (including individuals 
who suffer traumatic brain injury in the group that P&As are authorized to serve); and 
244 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 237
Under these governing statutes, P&As are granted certain rights 
and responsibilities.  They are broadly given the authority to “pursue 
legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies” on behalf of 
individuals with disabilities.32  Pursuant to this broad grant, P&As spe-
cifically have access to these individuals in any facility where “services, 
supports, and other assistance are provided.”33  P&As also have the au-
thority to view the records of individuals with disabilities34—in certain 
situations, without consent of either the individual or her legal guard-
ian.35  This access to individuals and records is available at any time for 
the purposes of investigating a suspected specific “incident of abuse or 
neglect.”36  Where a P&A is not investigating a specific incident, it is 
entitled to access facilities “at reasonable times” for the purposes of 
general advocacy (for example, the distribution of information or 
routine health and safety monitoring).37
Structurally, the federal statutes allow states to choose how to im-
plement their protection and advocacy systems.38  As a result, some 
states, such as Connecticut and Kentucky, choose to create independ-
ent state agencies, while others, such as Pennsylvania and Texas, con-
tract out to private nonprofit corporations for P&A services.39  In ei-
Protection & Advocacy for Voting Accessibility, 42 U.S.C. § 15461 (Supp. II 2002) (at-
tempting to ensure that individuals with disabilities participate in the electoral proc-
ess).  For an overview of the history, structure, and authority of P&As, as well as an ex-
planation of the way that the eight statutes work together, see Nat’l Disability Rights 
Network, The P&A/CAP System, http://www.napas.org/aboutus/PA_CAP.htm (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000); see also id. § 10805(a)(1)(B) (giving P&As 
the authority to “pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to en-
sure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treat-
ment in the State”).
33 Id. § 15043(a)(2)(H); see also id. § 10805(a)(3) (granting P&As “access to facili-
ties in the State providing care or treatment” to individuals with mental illness).
34 Id. §§ 10805(a)(4), 15043(a)(2)(I)–(J). 
35 Id. §§ 10805(a)(4), 15043(a)(2)(I). 
36 42 C.F.R. § 51.42(b) (2007); 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(f) (2007). 
37 42 C.F.R. § 51.42(c); 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(g). 
38 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10805(c)(1)(B) (recognizing that states have the option of 
authorizing P&As as “private non-profit entit[ies]” or as “public system[s]”). 
39 See Bowman, supra note 22, at 989-93 & n.180 (discussing different structural 
choices faced by states, primarily Kentucky, in implementing their protection and ad-
vocacy systems); see also Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, 
http://www.state.ct.us/opapd (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (Connecticut); Ky. Prot. & Ad-
vocacy, http://www.kypa.net (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); Disability Rights Network of 
Pa., http://www.drnpa.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); Advocacy, Inc.—About Us, 
http://www.advocacyinc.org/about.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (Texas).  There is 
some debate among disability-rights advocates as to which option is preferable.  See
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ther case, the P&A is statutorily required to implement procedures 
that facilitate the participation of individuals with disabilities in setting 
priorities.40  PADD requires that a majority of the members of a P&A’s 
governing board (for nonprofits, or for state agencies with governing 
boards) or advisory council (for state agencies without governing 
boards) be either individuals with disabilities who are eligible for or 
receiving services (or have received them in the past); or family mem-
bers, advocates, guardians, or authorized representatives of such indi-
viduals.41  The regulations clarifying these requirements are in place 
“to provide a voice for individuals with developmental disabilities.”42
Under PAIMI, the chair and sixty percent of the members of the advi-
sory council must be “individuals who have received or are receiving 
mental health services or who are family members of such individu-
als.”43  Both PADD and PAIMI regulations require that the public be 
given the opportunity to review and comment on the decisions made 
by a P&A’s governing authority and council.44  To that end, all proce-
dures for public comment must provide notice “in a format accessible 
to individuals with mental illness”45 or developmental disabilities.46
P&As must also “establish a grievance procedure . . . to ensure that in-
Bowman, supra note 22, at 989-93 & nn.179-198; see also infra note 151 (discussing the 
disparities between public and private funding received by P&As). 
40 The structure of a P&A is an important consideration in this analysis because 
courts look to structure to determine whether an organization is sufficiently account-
able to its membership to qualify for associational standing under Hunt.  For a discus-
sion about how this examination of structure plays out in doctrinal analysis, see infra
Part IV.A. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 15044(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii), (5)(B)(i)–(ii).  For example, Disability 
Rights Oregon, Oregon’s P&A, has a board of directors that “includes individuals with 
disabilities, family members of people with disabilities, [and] attorneys and other pro-
fessionals knowledgeable about disability issues.”  DISABILITY RIGHTS OREGON, available 
at http://www.oradvocacy.org/DRObrochure.pdf.  The Chair of the Board is an 
“[a]dvocate for persons with disabilities.” Id.  Other board members include the Presi-
dent of People First of Oregon, an organization that is a “pioneer in the People First and 
self-advocacy movement,” a movement led entirely by individuals with developmental dis-
abilities, People First of Or.:  Chapters and Officers, http://www.people1.org/about 
_us_oregon.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008), and the founder of SAFE, Inc., the only 
mental health drop-in center in the state that is “designed, owned, and operated en-
tirely by mental health system clients, ex-patients, and survivors,” Safe/Wonderland 
Project, What Is SAFE?, http://www.wonderland-safe.org/safe.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2008).
42 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(g) (2007). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(6)(B)–(C). 
44 42 C.F.R. § 51.24(a)–(b) (2007); 45 C.F.R. § 1386.31(a). 
45 42 C.F.R. § 51.24(b). 
46 45 C.F.R. § 1386.31(a). 
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dividuals with developmental disabilities have full access to services of 
the system.”47
The text of the statutes and accompanying regulations also explic-
itly mentions P&As’ power to sue on behalf of individuals with disabili-
ties.  Both PADD and PAIMI contain language generally authorizing 
the pursuit of legal remedies.48  More specifically, PADD states that, 
where available administrative procedures fail to adequately remedy a 
violation, a P&A may pursue alternative remedies—including the ini-
tiation of a legal action.49  Both PADD and PAIMI regulations allow 
for costs incurred by a P&A “in bringing lawsuits in its own right to re-
dress incidents of abuse or neglect, discrimination and other rights 
violations impacting on individuals with developmental disabilities”50
or mental illness.51  The PAIMI regulations further provide that “a 
P&A system may use any appropriate technique and pursue adminis-
trative, legal, or other appropriate remedies to protect and advocate 
on behalf of individuals with mental illness.”52  Statutory authority does 
not, however, allow an organization to bypass constitutional or other 
requirements.53  Federal courts have consistently held that Article III 
standing is a threshold matter that must be satisfied before an action 
can proceed;54 the question of standing must therefore be addressed 
in each suit brought by a P&A. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(E) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. § 51.25(a)(1) (“The P&A 
system shall establish procedures to address grievances from [c]lients or prospective 
clients of the P&A system to assure that individuals with mental illness have full access 
to the services of the program . . . .”). 
48 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10805(a)(1)(B), 15043(a)(2)(A)(i). 
49 See id. § 10807(a) (granting P&As the ability to initiate legal action where ad-
ministrative actions “will not be resolved within a reasonable time” or where adminis-
trative remedies have been exhausted). 
50 45 C.F.R. § 1386.25 (emphasis added). 
51 42 C.F.R. § 51.6(f) (2007). 
52 Id. § 51.31(a) (emphasis added). 
53 For example, P&As have clear statutory authority to access client records with 
the client’s permission, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10805(a)(4)(A), 15043(a)(2)(I)(i), but the Su-
preme Court of West Virginia has imposed an additional requirement in the form of a 
competency hearing.  See W. Va. Advocates, Inc. v. Appalachian Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 
447 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1994) (requiring a P&A to obtain a state court declaration 
of a client’s mental capability to grant the P&A access to her records); Bowman, supra
note 22, at 969-70 (discussing West Virginia Advocates).
54 See, e.g., Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (reject-
ing, on the ground that a statute “cannot override constitutional standing require-
ments,” a P&A’s attempt to use statutory authority to “short-circuit” the Oregon State 
Hospital’s argument that the P&A lacked standing”); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998) (rejecting the contention of the dissent and 
several courts of appeals that a court may assume hypothetical jurisdiction and pro-
2008] The Rights of Others 247
II. THE DOCTRINES OF STANDING AND ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING55
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction 
of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.”56  The development of 
ceed to the merits of the case without resolving the issue of standing); Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992) (Scalia, J., majority opinion, with 
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ., joining the plurality opinion as to this sec-
tion) (referring to the standing inquiry as a “threshold” issue); Mansfield, Coldwater & 
Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (characterizing jurisdictional in-
quiries as “the first and fundamental question” in all federal appeals); Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, 
and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of an-
nouncing the fact and dismissing the cause.”).
55 This Part provides a brief survey of standing law and focuses largely on Hunt.
For a more thorough history of standing, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Stand-
ing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-97 
(1992). See also PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 1126-28 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (citing the increased availability of 
remedies for constitutional violations and “the emergence of the administrative state” 
as the two factors that led to the development of the modern standing doctrine); 
PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 225-28 (1989) (tracing the Court’s late-twentieth-century standing jurispru-
dence and its relationship to the public-interest representation movement). 
56 The constitutional provision actually lists nine separate categories of cases and 
controversies where the federal courts may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of 
another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  There is considerable disagreement as to whether this lan-
guage confers mandatory jurisdiction on federal courts to any extent.  Compare Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 
1506-15 (1990) (using textual, structural, and historical evidence to support a “two-
tiered thesis,” which proposes that federal jurisdiction is mandatory in the three cate-
gories for which the Constitution extends jurisdiction to “all Cases”), with Jesse Choper 
& John Yoo, Wartime Process:  A Dialogue on Congressional Power to Remove Issues from the 
Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1260-61 (2007) (remarks of John Yoo) (critiquing 
Amar’s two-tiered thesis based on, among other historical inconsistencies, the absence 
of congressionally conferred general federal question jurisdiction for the first one 
hundred years of the United States’ nationhood).  The U.S. Supreme Court has long 
made clear, however, that Article III’s “case” or “controversy” language defines the 
outer limits of federal court jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 303, 304 (1810) (holding that a “statute cannot extend the jurisdiction be-
yond the limits of the Constitution”).  As the question of P&A associational standing 
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a concrete judicial test for standing, however, has been relatively re-
cent.57  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court synthesized 
the standing doctrine of the previous three decades by articulating a 
three-part test: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and 
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.  Second, there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged ac-
tion of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.  Third, it must be likely, as op-
posed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a fa-
vorable decision.58
Article III’s sparse “case” or “controversy” language does not lead 
inexorably to the modern judicial test for standing.  The connection 
between the three-prong test and the actual constitutional language 
would seem murky, at best, in the absence of further explanation.  
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has occasionally delineated its logic 
in the course of developing the standing doctrine.  The requirements 
of injury in fact, causation, and redressability are designed to ensure 
that all disputes adjudicated by the federal courts are cases or contro-
versies within the meaning of Article III.59  According to the Court, 
involves an exploration of the outer limits of federal jurisdiction, an analysis of the de-
bate described above is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
57 See Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing:  U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future 
of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 318 (2001) (“[P]rior to the 1970s, the 
Court . . . analyzed standing on a case-by-case basis, applying flexible and decidedly 
sub-constitutional standards.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public 
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1988) (“For most of the nation’s history, there was 
no distinctive body of standing doctrine.  Whether there was standing depended on 
whether positive law created a cause of action.”). 
58 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 
59 The constitutionalization of the standing doctrine happened under the Burger 
Court and has been characterized at least in part as an attempt to unburden packed 
federal dockets and to bar judicial interference with progressive legislation.  See John E. 
Bonine, Broadening “Standing to Sue” for Citizen Enforcement, in 2 FIFTH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 249, 257 ( Jo Ger-
ardu & Cheryl Wasserman eds., 1999) (“Remarkable developments in recent years po-
sition the United States as one of a handful, at most, of countries where the Supreme 
Court is starting to assert the power to reject efforts by the democratically elected legis-
lative branch of government to specify who may bring lawsuits to court . . . .”); Gilles, 
supra note 57, at 322-26 (arguing that the Burger Court both replaced the Warren 
Court’s liberal prudential standing inquiry with a more constitutionally based inquiry 
and articulated the standing doctrine’s connection to separation-of-powers principles); 
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L.
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this language requires that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will 
be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed 
as capable of judicial resolution.”60  A “personal stake” in the dispute 
ensures the “concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court[s] so largely depend[] for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions.”61  The standing doctrine, then, can 
be viewed as playing a gatekeeper function, admitting only true cases 
or controversies that will be vigorously litigated in a manner that pre-
sents the strongest arguments on each side, thus promoting the cor-
rect legal outcome. 
Beyond the Article III case-or-controversy requirement, however, 
the standing test also serves a separation-of-powers function.62  The 
standing test functions to admit controversies that courts ought to de-
cide while rejecting disputes that are better resolved by the political 
branches, to which citizens have access via the right to vote.63  Justice 
Scalia has been prolific on this topic: 
There is, I think, a functional relationship [between the doctrine of 
standing and the role of the courts in the separation-of-powers system], 
which can best be described by saying that the law of standing roughly 
REV. 1371, 1452-57 (1988) (listing five reasons for the convergence of the “metaphor” 
of standing and the “private rights model,” including a dramatic increase in the work-
load of federal courts and liberal Justices’ interest in “protecting the legislative sphere 
from judicial interference”).  For an argument that the standing test as constructed 
misses the point of Article III, see generally Sunstein, supra note 57, at 1461-80, which 
contends that the standing test is underinclusive and frequently bars justiciable cases 
and controversies from being heard, and Winter, supra, at 1460-63, 1470, which argues 
that the focus on standing as a “threshold” issue artificially separates the standing crite-
ria from the merits.  See also Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States:  How 
Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong 
Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2246-49 (1999) (demonstrating that the injury-in-fact 
requirement of Article III is “nonsense” by using the hypothetical case of a public de-
fender moving for dismissal in a criminal prosecution on the ground that the govern-
ment lacks a “personal, concrete, and particularized injury in fact”).  But see Michael S. 
Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (2001) 
(criticizing the Court’s deviation from the strict standing doctrine as a violation of the 
principles underlying the Court’s then-recent federalism decisions). 
60 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). 
61 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Ad-
ver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 341 (1977). 
62 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60 (describing the standing doctrine as a “landmark” 
that helps to define the judiciary’s proper constitutional function). 
63 The Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of separation-of-powers 
concerns to the standing analysis. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 
S. Ct. 2553, 2569 (2007) (plurality opinion) (criticizing Flast for depicting the standing 
inquiry as solely about adverseness and failing to acknowledge the separation-of-powers 
values that it serves).
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restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting indi-
viduals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes 
them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the 
other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the 
majority itself.
64
The constitutional portions of the standing inquiry, as expressed in the 
three-part test, cannot be waived.65  If a federal court finds one of the 
three pieces lacking, it must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.66
In addition to the constitutional three-part test, the Supreme 
Court has also imposed “prudential” limitations on standing to sue in 
federal court.  These limitations, unlike the constitutional require-
ments, can be removed at the discretion of the court.  Generally, a 
plaintiff must assert her own interests rather than the interests of third 
parties;67 the injury alleged must not be so “pervasively shared” that it 
amounts to a “generalized grievance”;68 and the complaint must “fall 
within the ‘zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the stat-
ute or constitutional guarantee under which the plaintiff seeks re-
lief.’”69  These requirements, while “closely related to Art[icle] III con-
cerns, are not constitutional and are essentially matters of judicial self-
64 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983).  Justice Scalia argues that it is the 
proper realm of the judiciary to vindicate individual rights and the proper realm of the 
legislature to make decisions about advancing the general public interest.  Because the 
issue here is whether P&As are proper representatives of their constituents under 
Hunt—and not whether the injury-in-fact requirement is a proper component of the 
standing test—this Comment does not explore the separation-of-powers argument in 
depth.  For a further discussion of the importance of the injury-in-fact requirement, 
see Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver:  Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protec-
tion, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 59 (2001), which argues that weakening injury-
in-fact requirements would both “shift the incentives faced by those individuals that 
would consider” filing environmental citizen suits and “increase[] the potential for 
rent-seeking and the pursuit of other agendas.” 
65 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (describing the three-part test as an “irreducible constitu-
tional minimum”). 
66 See supra note 54 (listing examples where the Court has made clear that stand-
ing is a threshold jurisdictional question).
67 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). 
68 Id. at 474-75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).  
This prudential requirement is closely tied to separation-of-powers concerns, as “perva-
sively shared” injuries presumably can be resolved through the legislative process. 
69 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). 
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governance.”70  Their existence outside of the constitutional “irre-
ducible minimum” means courts can decide to allow exceptions.71
One such exception is the doctrine of associational standing.  
While individuals generally must assert their own rights, the Court has 
long recognized that there are some benefits to allowing organizations 
to litigate claims on behalf of their members.  The Court has held that 
various types of organizations, including trade associations,72 unions,73
and nonprofit corporations,74 fall within this exception.  To ensure 
that an association has sufficient ties to the controversy it is litigating 
on behalf of its members, federal courts apply a three-part test:  “[A]n 
association has standing to [sue] when:  (a) its members would other-
wise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks 
to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither 
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation 
of individual members in the lawsuit.”75  This test leaves unclear, how-
ever, the important question of what exactly “membership” in an or-
ganization means for these purposes. 
An organization seeking to assert associational standing must 
demonstrate that its ties both to its members and to the controversy 
are tight enough to ensure vigorous litigation and proper respect for 
the appropriate sphere of the judicial branch.  But that is not the only
issue.  The doctrines of associational and third-party standing76 dem-
onstrate that the Court is not solely concerned with containing its au-
thority within the proper constitutional bounds.77  As a secondary mat-
70 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
71 See Gilles, supra note 57, at 318 n.17 (“[P]rudential limitations on standing tend 
to be flexible standards based on policy and fairness rather than rigid rules of constitu-
tional construction based on separation of powers.”). 
72 See, e.g., Nat’l Motor Freight Traffic Ass’n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 247 
(1963) (per curiam) (granting the appellant, an association of motor carriers, standing 
to challenge an administrative order on the ground that “appellants are proper repre-
sentatives of the interests of their members”).
73 See, e.g., UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281-88 (1986).
74 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1957) (up-
holding the NAACP’s ability to assert its members’ constitutional rights to resist an 
Alabama court order requiring the organization to turn over its membership lists). 
75 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
76 See Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of Representational Standing, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2003) (“[T]hird-party standing allows a litigant to bring suit on 
behalf of a third party if the litigant and third party share a ‘close relationship,’ the 
litigant is also injured, and the third party is hindered from bringing the suit on her 
own behalf.” (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991))). 
77 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 
517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (“[T]he entire doctrine of ‘representational standing’ . . . 
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ter, the Court has created exceptions to the prudential limitations.  
The exceptions are designed to ensure that, within the constitution-
ally allowable limits, parties that experience actual injury are realisti-
cally able to bring their claims in court.  The Court was not required 
to continue upholding associational standing; as it developed a stricter 
standing doctrine, the Court could have struck down the relationships 
between the associations and their members as too attenuated.  There 
is no constitutional requirement that federal courts hear every justici-
able case or controversy.  Still, the Court opted to retain associational 
standing, and, in Hunt, it indicated that its interpretation of the doc-
trine would not always be the narrowest possible reading of precedent.78
As this decision makes clear, the Court recognizes that individuals 
sometimes need advocates to sue on their behalf.79  Organizations 
have resources and expertise that their members lack.  Where a mem-
ber of the organization has an actual injury and the expert organiza-
tion has an interest in litigating the claim, the quality of the organiza-
tion’s case presentation will potentially exceed that of the individual 
plaintiff.  In addition, individuals often face significant economic and 
other barriers to bringing suit in the adversarial system, especially 
when those individuals have limited resources or claims for only small 
damages.  If the court system is supposed to both provide redress for 
unjustly injured individuals and also deter injurious behavior in the 
future, it should create incentives for wronged individuals, or others 
suing on their behalf, to bring their claims.  Granting associational 
standing to an organization whose members might otherwise be de-
terred from bringing suit is one way to provide such an incentive. 
Hunt provided an important elaboration on the Court’s associa-
tional standing doctrine.  In Hunt, the Washington State Apple Adver-
tising Commission—a state agency composed of thirteen elected offi-
rests on the premise that in certain circumstances, particular relationships . . . are suf-
ficient to rebut the background presumption . . . that litigants may not assert the rights 
of absent third parties.”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“Standing doc-
trine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal 
rights . . . .”). 
78 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45 (recognizing the state agency’s associational standing 
despite the fact that it did not fit the mold of a “traditional trade association,” which 
typically has voluntary “members”). 
79 Any exception to the general rule barring an individual from suing on behalf of 
another implicates questions about autonomy.  For a discussion about autonomy con-
cerns in the context of P&As’ associational standing, see infra Part IV.B. 
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cials—challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute.80
The statute, which restricted packaging and publication of certain in-
spection grades on apples shipped in interstate commerce, worked to 
the disadvantage of the Washington apple industry, and the Commis-
sion argued that it impermissibly interfered with interstate com-
merce.81  North Carolina challenged the Commission’s standing to 
bring suit, arguing that its connection to the controversy was tenuous 
and that it lacked a “personal stake” in the litigation, which, at the 
time, was cited as the primary inquiry underlying the standing doc-
trine.82  North Carolina contended that the Commission could not 
meet the requirements of associational standing because it did not 
have “members” in the same sense as the trade associations, unions, 
and nonprofit corporations previously granted standing.83
The Court rejected North Carolina’s argument as an overly for-
malistic application of its previous associational standing jurispru-
dence,84 adopting instead the “functional equivalence test”85 quoted 
above.86  The Court said that the Commission “for all practical pur-
poses perform[ed] the functions of a traditional trade association.”87
In addition, 
while the apple growers and dealers [were] not “members” of the Com-
mission in the traditional trade association sense, they possess[ed] all of 
the indicia of membership. . . . They alone elect[ed] the members of the 
Commission; they alone [could] serve on the Commission; they alone fi-
nance[d] its activities, including the costs of this lawsuit . . . .
88
In dismissing North Carolina’s argument that lack of voluntary mem-
bership meant that the Commission lacked standing, the Court drew 
an analogy to union membership by noting that unions, like the Com-
mission, frequently feature compulsory membership.89  Finally, the 
80 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337-39. 
81 Id.
82 See id. at 341 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (describing the 
“personal stake” requirement as “the gist of the question of standing”)). 
83 See id. at 342. 
84 See id. at 345 (“Under the circumstances presented here, it would exalt form 
over substance to differentiate between the Washington Commission and a traditional 
trade association representing the individual growers and dealers who collectively form 
its constituency.”) 
85 Coplan, supra note 15, at 53. 
86 See supra text accompanying note 75. 
87 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. 
88 Id.
89 Id. at 345. 
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Court noted that the fact that the Commission’s own interests were 
threatened (because its funding was tied to industry profit margins) 
created a “financial nexus” that “coalesce[d] with the other factors 
noted above to ‘assure . . . concrete adverseness.’”90
Hunt made clear that an organization does not need voluntary 
“members” to have associational standing, but it did little to elucidate 
its reasoning.91  In 1986, the Court was faced with a request to over-
turn Hunt.92  It declined to do so, and in the process finally shed light 
on the reasoning underlying Hunt.93  In UAW v. Brock, the Court said 
that organizations have “special features” that are “advantageous both 
to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a whole”—
namely, that an “association suing to vindicate the interests of its 
members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capi-
tal.”94  Quoting an opinion from the Southern District of New York, 
the Court reasoned that “‘[t]he interest and expertise of this plaintiff, 
when asserted on behalf of its directly affected members, assure . . . 
concrete adverseness.’”95
Under Hunt and its progeny, several characteristics clearly support 
a conclusion that an organization has “members,” or the functional 
equivalent thereof, and therefore can satisfy the membership re-
quirement of associational standing:  members (formal or otherwise) 
serve on the governing board, vote to elect the board’s membership, 
and finance the group’s activities.96  It is unclear, however, whether 
other combinations of “indicia of membership” might satisfy this in-
90 Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
91 See Coplan, supra note 15, at 53 (“Although Hunt adopts a functional equivalence 
test . . . , the Court did not explicate the Article III interests served by these functions.”). 
92 See UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 288-90 (1986). 
93 See id.
94 Id. at 289. 
95 Id. at 289  (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harlem Valley Transp. 
Ass’n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).  Interest, expertise, and 
funds are frequently cited as reasons that organizations can, at least sometimes, repre-
sent their members’ interests better than the members themselves.  See, e.g., Flint, supra
note 76, at 1046 (stating that the Supreme Court has recognized that organizational 
resources ensure a “high standard of aggressive advocacy”); Dale Gronemeier, Com-
ment, From Net to Sword:  Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Members’ Claims,
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663, 668-69 (noting that organizations’ “financial strength,” “special-
ized expertise and research resources,” and “purification of individual interests” result 
in more effective litigation). 
96 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1977). 
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quiry.97  Lower-court decisions applying Hunt have reached conflicting 
results.98  For groups, like P&As, that are neither traditional member-
ship organizations nor exact replicas of the Commission in Hunt, as-
sociational standing remains an open question. 
III. THE SPLIT ON ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING FOR P&AS
PAIMI and PADD make clear that P&As can represent protected 
individuals who are named plaintiffs in litigation.99  It is equally clear 
that P&As are authorized to sue on their own behalf by alleging injury 
to themselves.100  But for a P&A to sue on behalf of the individuals it 
protects when those individuals are not themselves plaintiffs, it must 
meet the test for associational standing.101  The federal courts of ap-
peals that have ruled on the issue are divided as to whether P&As are 
sufficiently like traditional membership organizations to meet the re-
quirements for standing under Hunt.  The Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have held that P&As have associational standing to sue on behalf 
of individuals with disabilities, while the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have 
held that they do not.102
97 See Coplan, supra note 15, at 55 (noting that the Hunt Court “failed to spell 
out . . . the irreducible minimum of” the traditional indicia of membership). 
98 See infra Part III; see also Coplan, supra note 15, at 61-65 (listing cases denying 
and granting standing to environmental organizations that do not extend voting rights 
to their members); id. at 70-75 (outlining varying interpretations of Hunt’s applicabil-
ity to P&A standing). 
99 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
100 For example, P&As can claim that their First Amendment rights have been vio-
lated when they are denied access to records. See, e.g., Developmental Disabilities Ad-
vocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating that certain “legal 
advocacy organizations have first amendment rights which, in appropriate circum-
stances, may permit them to seek out clients and initiate litigation”) (citing NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963)).
101 It is important to note that P&As can often use organizational standing to ad-
vocate on behalf of their constituents.  Any time a P&A has spent time, money, and 
resources on nonlitigation activities, it can assert organizational standing under Button.
This strategy applies not only in cases where a P&A seeks access to records, but in 
other institutional cases as well.  This Comment’s focus is on associational standing, 
but strategically, P&As often find that asserting organizational standing is useful either 
in lieu of or as a complement to asserting associational standing.  See, e.g., Pa. Prot. & 
Advocacy, Inc. v. Houston, 136 F. Supp. 2d. 353, 361-64 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that a 
P&A that had spent “time, money, and resources” on advocacy against a particular pol-
icy and on counseling families harmed by that policy had organizational standing to 
sue on its own behalf). 
102 The Seventh Circuit also recently decided a case involving a claim for P&A as-
sociational standing. See Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Walworth County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 522 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2008).  The court specifically noted, however, that the 
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The Fifth Circuit was the first to address the issue.  In Association 
for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Re-
tardation Center Board of Trustees,103 a P&A called Advocacy, Inc.104
brought suit on behalf of itself and a minor with developmental dis-
abilities, Matt W., alleging violations of, among other statutes, the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA).105  In a brief opinion, the Fifth Circuit dismissed 
the case for lack of standing.  After rejecting Advocacy, Inc.’s standing 
based on allegations of injury to the organization itself,106 the court 
addressed the issue of associational standing.  Advocacy, Inc. argued 
that application of the Hunt fact pattern as the exclusive formula for 
finding sufficient indicia of membership is inappropriate where an 
organization’s constituency is “not capable of functioning as typical 
and traditional members of an organization.”107  The court rejected 
this reasoning and affirmed the judgment of the district court, hold-
ing that individuals with disabilities are not “members” of P&As be-
cause “[t]he organization bears no relationship to traditional mem-
bership groups because most of its ‘clients’—handicapped and 
disabled people—are unable to participate in and guide the organiza-
tion’s efforts.”108
Five years later, in Doe v. Stincer, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly de-
clined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning from Dallas County and 
held that P&As have associational standing because their constitu-
ents possess sufficient indicia of membership.109  In Stincer, Advocacy 
question whether P&As are membership organizations for the purposes of the associa-
tional standing analysis had been conceded by the county.  Id. at 803.  The court based 
its denial of associational standing on its conclusion that none of the plaintiff’s mem-
bers had suffered a cognizable injury.  Id. at 802-04. 
103 19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994). 
104 Advocacy, Inc. is the P&A for the state of Texas.  It is an independent nonprofit 
and is not located within the state government.  See Advocacy, Inc.—About Us, supra
note 39. 
105 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2000).  Matt W.’s transfer to a permanent home was 
significantly delayed because of a neighborhood association’s opposition to the con-
struction of the home.  The P&A claimed that the delay had caused irreparable harm 
to Matt W. and five other children, and that the neighborhood association’s obstruc-
tion of the home would inhibit development of group homes for the disabled in the 
future. Dallas County, 19 F.3d at 243. 
106 Dallas County, 19 F.3d at 243-44. 
107 Brief of Appellant Advocacy, Inc. at 14, Dallas County, 19 F.3d 241 (No. 93-
1573), 1993 WL 13104421. 
108 Dallas County, 19 F.3d at 244. 
109 Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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Center,110 the Florida P&A, challenged a Florida statute denying pa-
tients the right of access to their medical records concerning treat-
ment for mental or emotional conditions.111  Advocacy Center alleged 
that the statute violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.112  Florida 
challenged Advocacy Center’s participation in the suit, arguing that 
under Hunt and according to Dallas County, Advocacy Center lacked 
standing to sue because it did not have members.113  In addressing this 
argument, the Florida court pointed out that the Supreme Court in 
Hunt had “specifically reject[ed] the argument that the Apple Adver-
tising Commission lacked standing because it did not have any mem-
bers.”114  The court reasoned that Congress’s statutory authorization 
for P&As “to act as agencies to protect and enforce the rights of [dis-
abled individuals]” made the P&As significantly similar to the Adver-
tising Commission in Hunt, which “‘serve[d] a specialized segment of 
the . . . community which [was] the primary beneficiary of its activities, 
including prosecution of this kind of litigation.’”115  While P&As might 
not have “members” in the same sense that unions or trade organiza-
tions do, the Eleventh Circuit held that individuals with disabilities 
have enough memberlike characteristics to be considered “members” 
for the purposes of the Hunt associational standing test.116
The Ninth Circuit subsequently addressed P&As’ associational 
standing in 2003 in Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink.117 Mink provides 
the most comprehensive consideration of the arguments for and 
against associational standing for P&As by any of the courts of appeals.  
In Mink, the Oregon Advocacy Center118 sued state officials on the 
grounds that delays in evaluating and treating criminal defendants 
with mental illness violated the defendants’ constitutional rights to 
110 Like Advocacy, Inc. in Dallas County, Advocacy Center is a nongovernmental 
nonprofit organization.  See Advocacy Ctr. for Persons with Disabilities, Inc., About the 
Advocacy Center, http://www.advocacycenter.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
111 See Stincer, 175 F.3d at 881. 
112 Id.
113 See id. at 885. 
114 Id.
115 Id. at 886 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 
344 (1977)). 
116 Id.
117 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003). 
118 The Oregon Advocacy Center has since changed its name to Disability Rights 
Oregon.  Disability Rights Oregon is an independent nonprofit organization.  See Dis-
ability Rights Or., http://www.disabilityrightsoregon.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
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substantive and procedural due process.119  The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that the facts could be distinguished in some ways from Hunt
but advanced arguments supporting the applicability of associational 
standing to P&As based on salient similarities, concluding that the 
Center was the “functional equivalent of a voluntary membership or-
ganization.”120  The court highlighted the fact that protected individu-
als had access to formal grievance procedures and that P&As are statu-
torily required under PAIMI to establish an advisory council 
composed of people who receive or have received mental health ser-
vices and their family members, arguing that these facts made pro-
tected individuals substantially similar to “members” of the Commis-
sion in Hunt.121
Most recently, in Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services, Inc. v. 
Carnahan,122 the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in denying as-
sociational standing to a P&A.  Missouri Protection & Advocacy Ser-
vices, Inc. (MOPAS)123 brought an equal protection challenge to a 
Missouri constitutional provision and its accompanying election laws 
denying “incapacitated” persons (defined as persons under guardian-
ship orders) the right to vote.124  Relying on the “indicia-of-
membership” portion of the Hunt opinion and the holding in Dallas 
County, the court concluded that MOPAS failed to meet the first 
prong of the associational standing test because individuals with dis-
abilities neither had the power to elect the leadership of MOPAS nor 
financed MOPAS’s activities.125
In circuits that have not yet ruled on the issue, the federal district 
courts are divided on the question of standing for P&As under Hunt.
Most, but not all, district courts have followed the Eleventh and Ninth 
Circuits in holding that P&As qualify for associational standing.126  It is 
119 See Mink, 322 F.3d at 1105. 
120 Id. at 1111. 
121 See id. at 1112. 
122 499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007).
123 MOPAS is an independent, nongovernmental organization.  See Mo. Prot.& 
Advocacy Servs., http://www.moadvocacy.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
124 Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 806, 808. 
125 Id. at 810.  The Eighth Circuit went on to conclude that even if MOPAS had 
satisfied the first associational standing requirement, it would have failed to satisfy the 
third because the participation of individual constituents with specific claims was re-
quired. Id.  I argue that the third prong of the associational standing test is not at issue 
because it is prudential and has been abrogated by Congress.  See infra Part IV.B. 
126 See, e.g., N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Davy, No. 05-1784, 2005 WL 2416962, at 
*2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2005) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s approach to P&A associational 
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important to note that even when courts uphold the ability of P&As to 
sue on behalf of their constituents under Hunt, P&As have often been 
denied standing for failing to assert actual harm to a particular indi-
vidual.  In Stincer, for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that allega-
tions that “many” people who wanted to examine their own mental 
health records had been denied access did not establish that a P&A-
protected individual had suffered a “concrete injury” traceable to the 
policy in question.127  The court held that the complaint failed to al-
lege harm to a protected individual under PAIMI, which requires a 
person either to be currently receiving treatment or to have been dis-
charged within the past ninety days in order to be a “member” of the 
P&A who can allow the P&A to satisfy the first prong of the associa-
tional standing test.128
The approach of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits turns on the word 
“member” as it relates to the Hunt indicia-of-membership criteria.129
While appealing in its simplicity, this approach fails to recognize that 
Hunt itself was a repudiation of the overly formalistic application of 
this word in associational standing cases.  In Hunt, the Court rejected 
arguments based on the status of the organization and instead asked 
what function the Commission performed, concluding that it was “for 
standing as “excessively rigid and formalistic”); Univ. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Saint Eliza-
beths Hosp., No. 05-0585, 2005 WL 3275915, at *4-5 (D.D.C. July 22, 2005) (finding 
that Hunt’s first prong was satisfied because University Legal Services had a “constitu-
ency” and also that PAIMI had abrogated Hunt’s third prong); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. 
Supp. 2d 211, 224 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that Disability Advocates, Inc., an author-
ized P&A, satisfied Hunt’s first prong by bringing claims on behalf of its constituents).
P&As generally seem to have more success asserting associational standing when the 
injured individuals with disabilities join in the litigation as named plaintiffs or exem-
plars. Compare Mental Disability Law Clinic, Touro Law Ctr. v. Carpinello, 189 F. App’x 
5, 7 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming a district court’s conclusion that a P&A had associational 
standing under PAIMI in a suit with two individual named plaintiffs in addition to the 
P&A), and Procurador de Personas con Impedimentos v. Municipality of San Juan, 541 
F. Supp. 2d 468, 470, 472 (D.P.R. 2008) (concluding that a P&A had satisfied the 
three-prong test for associational standing in a case with three individual named plain-
tiffs in addition to the P&A), with Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 24 F. 
Supp. 2d 808, 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (denying associational standing in a case where a 
P&A failed to sue “on behalf of specific, named, injured individuals”).
127 Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 887 (11th Cir. 1999).
128 Id.  In Stincer, the court held that the general allegations regarding “many” in-
dividuals, without more to establish that those individuals were protected under the 
governing statute, were insufficient to establish that any PAIMI “members” could have 
sued in their own right.  The P&A therefore did not meet the first requirement for as-
sociational standing.  Id.
129 See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 810; Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County 
Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trs., 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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all practical purposes” the same as a traditional trade association.130
The Court investigated the relationship between the Commission and 
the apple growers on the theory that an organization’s responsiveness 
to its members’ needs served as a measure of how zealously it would 
litigate a conflict if one of those members were injured.131  The Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits declined to engage in any such substantive in-
quiry, limiting their analyses to whether the P&As met each of the in-
dicia laid out in Hunt :  financial support, voting power, and opportu-
nity for leadership.  This latter approach exalts form over substance, 
precisely what the Hunt Court sought to avoid.132
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits’ opinions go further in moving 
beyond a formalistic inquiry but fail to explore fully all the important 
considerations in the P&A associational standing analysis.  They reject 
the idea that an organization must possess all of the Hunt indicia of 
membership, yet they frame their holdings by linking P&As as closely 
as possible to the indicia of the Advertising Commission in Hunt.  In 
Stincer, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Advocacy Center was suffi-
ciently analogous to the Commission in Hunt to make its constituents 
“members” for the purposes of associational standing.133  The court 
highlighted the role of individuals and family members of individuals 
with mental illness in serving on the P&A governing board and the 
procedures for public comment.134  The Ninth Circuit’s Mink analysis 
closely paralleled that of the Eleventh Circuit in Stincer, focusing again 
on the governing board and advisory council and noting that the 
Oregon Advocacy Center served a “specialized segment of [the] 
community.”135  These analyses address the first part of the inquiry—
whether the Hunt indicia of membership as an expression of Article 
III permit P&A standing.  However, they fail to take into account the 
secondary question—whether granting associational standing to P&As 
is consistent with the reason that courts allow a prudential exception 
for associational standing in the first place. 
130 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. 
131 See Coplan, supra note 15, at 54 (“[F]or an organization to bring [the] neces-
sary ‘concrete adverseness’ to litigation, it must be sufficiently responsive to those of its 
constituents who have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ and bring the same full and zealous 
representation as the individuals would themselves.”). 
132 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (citing Hunt’s use of a “functional 
equivalent test”). 
133 Stincer, 175 F.3d at 886. 
134 Id.
135 Mink, 322 F.3d at 1111-12. 
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While the board-membership, grievance-procedure, and public-
comment requirements in PADD and PAIMI are certainly important 
considerations, merely filling in pieces of the Hunt indicia-of-
membership test misses the broader point of the standing inquiry.  
The Court itself called Hunt a rejection of form-over-substance inquir-
ies and pointed out various attributes of the Advertising Commission 
that ensured its tight connection to its membership.  It thus indicated 
that the Commission was a legitimate representative of its members’ 
interests—granting the Commission standing was not only constitu-
tionally permissible but would serve other judicial values, such as pro-
viding for the thorough litigation of the issues (because of the Com-
mission’s expertise and resources).  Under Hunt, then, the central 
questions in analyzing P&As’ eligibility for associational standing are 
(1) whether the information about P&As, taken as a whole, indicates a 
relationship between P&As and individuals with disabilities such that a 
P&A can constitutionally represent the interests of those individuals in 
the courtroom, and (2) whether, as a secondary matter, P&As are the 
type of organization for which federal courts ought to make an excep-
tion to the general prohibition against suing on behalf of another. 
IV. P&AS UNDER HUNT
Granting P&As associational standing is both within the limits of 
Article III and consonant with the values underlying associational 
standing.  P&As are statutorily constructed to be tightly tied to the in-
dividuals with disabilities whom they represent.  They must consult 
with individuals with disabilities and their family members in deciding 
agency priorities, both by reserving space on their boards and advisory 
councils for those individuals, and by providing formal grievance pro-
cedures and opportunities for public comment.  Fidelity to the statu-
tory goal of protecting and advocating on behalf of individuals with 
disabilities has the power to impact both government funding and 
public donations.  These procedural protections demonstrate that 
P&As are closely connected to the interests of those whom they serve, 
thereby satisfying the requirements of Article III.  Further, Congress 
has recognized the stark reality of the world for individuals with dis-
abilities absent publicly funded, independent advocates.  Willow-
brook’s lessons of disease, injury, and death inspired Congress to es-
tablish a government-funded check on state influence on the lives of 
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individuals with disabilities.136  In enacting the P&As’ enabling legisla-
tion, Congress carefully considered issues of autonomy and consent 
and determined that P&As should have the power to access facilities, 
view records, and litigate on behalf of individuals with disabilities in 
the state.  As with housing and employment discrimination, Congress 
recognized a need and has designated P&As as organizations for 
which the courts ought to impose no barrier to standing other than 
the constitutional one. 
In Hunt, the Supreme Court refined and articulated a three-part 
test for associational standing.137  For purposes of this Comment, I as-
sume that the second portion of the test, requiring germaneness to 
the organization’s purpose, is not at issue.  No challenger to P&A as-
sociational standing has attempted to argue that the issue at the cen-
ter of the litigation is not sufficiently germane to the association’s 
purpose.  I also assume that the P&A in question is able to identify a 
disabled individual within the state who would have standing to sue if 
not represented by the P&A.  Thus, my inquiry is, first, whether indi-
viduals with disabilities are members, or sufficiently similar to members, 
of P&As for purposes of constitutional standing, and second, whether 
Congress has effectively abrogated prudential barriers to granting as-
sociational standing.  This inquiry splits into constitutional and pru-
dential components.  First, the question is whether P&As have suffi-
cient ties to individuals with disabilities such that a lawsuit brought on 
behalf of one of those individuals will satisfy Article III.  If so, a second 
question emerges:  whether persuasive reasons exist for federal courts 
to create an exception to the prudential rule that no one may sue on 
behalf of another individual. 
A.  The Irreducible Minimum:  P&As as Zealous 
Litigants of Their Constituents’ Claims 
The Supreme Court has recognized that, at least in some cases, 
organizations are better positioned to fight for their members’ rights 
than the members themselves: 
While a class action creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who 
may be linked only by their common claims, an association suing to vin-
dicate the interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reser-
voir of expertise and capital. . . . “[T]he interest and expertise of [an or-
ganization], when exerted on behalf of its directly affected members, 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26. 
137 See supra text accompanying note 75. 
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assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is-
sues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diffi-
cult . . . questions.”
138
Numerous commentators have agreed with this characterization of 
the advantages of organizational litigation.139  Some have even sug-
gested that organizations perform the function of weeding out frivo-
lous lawsuits by requiring the support of multiple actors.140
So are individuals with disabilities constitutional “members” of 
P&As?  Here, the focus of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits in Stincer
and Mink becomes relevant.  The placement of individuals with dis-
abilities on governing boards and advisory councils, the opportunity 
for public comment, and the availability of complaint and appeal 
processes all indicate that P&As are statutorily designed to respond to 
the needs of individuals with disabilities.  There are clear differences 
between the structure of P&As and the structure of organizations pre-
viously granted associational standing under Hunt.  Some courts have 
signaled their awareness of these differences by designating individu-
als with disabilities as “constituents” or “clients” of P&As rather than 
“members.”141  It would be disingenuous to argue that there are not 
differences between the Commission in Hunt and P&As.  The direct 
power to elect a governing board142 and the financial nexus between 
members and an organization143 have been highlighted as strong indi-
cators that a group is sufficiently under the control of its members to 
“stand[] in their shoes in the courtroom.”144  Despite these differences 
138 UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986) (quoting Harlem Valley Transp. Ass’n 
v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
139 See, e.g., Gronemeier, supra note 95, at 669 (“Besides financial resources, or-
ganizations often have specialized expertise and research resources relating to the sub-
ject matter of the lawsuit that individual plaintiffs lack.”); Karen Orren, Standing to Sue:  
Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723, 734 (1976) 
(“[O]rganizations with specialized purposes and experience in a given and frequently 
unfamiliar subject area would seem to meet the need for the sharp presentation of is-
sues which the Court has said is the ‘gist’ of standing.”). 
140 See, e.g., Orren, supra note 139, at 734 (“[O]rganizational plaintiffs perform a 
valuable judicial function.  If judges must distinguish genuine concern . . . from a bad 
faith or spurious suit, membership in a recognized organization is one indicator.”). 
141 See, e.g., Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & 
Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trs., 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that Ad-
vocacy, Inc. did not satisfy the first prong of the associational standing test because the 
individual on whose behalf the organization sued was not a “member,” but rather a 
“client,” of the organization). 
142 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. 
143 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958). 
144 See Gronemeier, supra note 95, at 663.
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between the Commission and P&As, P&As are sufficiently structurally 
responsive to individuals with disabilities to meet the minimum consti-
tutional requirements, and their “constituents” or “clients” are consti-
tutional “members” for purposes of the associational standing analysis. 
As discussed in Part II, P&As are statutorily constructed to be re-
sponsive to the population that they are charged with serving.  
Whether operating within or without the state government’s structure, 
P&As must have a governing board or advisory council where a major-
ity (under PADD) or sixty percent (under PAIMI) of the members are 
individuals with current or former disabilities or mental illness, or 
family members, guardians, advocates, or authorized representatives 
of those individuals.145  In addition, the public must be given the op-
portunity to comment on all decisions made by the governing author-
ity and council, and procedures for public comment must be provided 
“in a format accessible” to individuals with disabilities or mental ill-
ness.146  P&As must also establish formal grievance procedures to en-
sure full access to the system.147  While some individuals with disabili-
ties could participate fully in a traditionally structured membership 
organization by voting or contributing money, many of the people 
whom P&As are charged with serving are “not capable of functioning 
as typical and traditional members of an organization.”148  In drafting 
PADD and PAIMI, Congress sought to structure P&As in a way that 
would make them responsive to the particular needs of the disability 
community.  The presence of individuals with disabilities, along with 
their family members, on boards and advisory councils, combined 
with mechanisms for public comment and the airing of grievances, 
provides a set of safeguards designed to keep P&As’ fingers on the 
pulse of the needs of a community composed of often difficult-to-
reach individuals. 
Analyzing the structure of an organization is only one part of a 
broader inquiry designed to evaluate the “pressures on an organiza-
tion to pursue its members’ interests.  Those pressures include the ad-
vantages to the organization of successful representation [and] the 
threat to the organization’s survival from inadequate or unsuccessful 
representation . . . .”149  In addition to membership pressures, organi-
145 42 U.S.C. § 15044(a)(1)(B), 5(B) (2000); id. § 10805(a)(6)(B). 
146 42 C.F.R. § 51.24(a)–(b) (2007); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1386.31(a) (2007). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(E); 42 C.F.R. § 51.25. 
148 Brief of Appellant Advocacy, Inc., supra note 107, at 14. 
149 Gronemeier, supra note 95, at 668-69. 
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zations are also subject to external pressures that will affect future 
funding (by either donation or legislative appropriation) and other 
forms of support.150  Granting associational standing to organizations 
like the NAACP, the ACLU, and the Sierra Club is premised partly on 
the idea that members can vote with their wallets.  There is no reason 
to believe financial pressures do not apply to P&As, if to a lesser de-
gree.  A P&A’s failure to represent effectively the interests of individu-
als with disabilities could result in a reduction in private donations151
or, more dramatically, in a state’s decision to contract with another 
nonprofit or in a reduction in federal funding.152
150 See id. at 669 (noting the strong “publicity value” inherent in an organization’s 
participation in a lawsuit as the named plaintiff). 
151 The amount of private donations, or “direct public support,” that P&As receive 
varies widely, but it is consistently small when compared to the government funding 
that a P&A receives.  For instance, Disability Rights Oregon (at the time, the Oregon 
Advocacy Center) received $140,744 in direct public support in 2005, compared to 
$1,571,498 in government funding.  See Or. Advocacy Ctr., Return of Organization Ex-
empt from Income Tax (Form 990), at 1 (May 3, 2007).  By contrast, Advocacy, Inc., of 
Texas, received $124,834 in direct public support in 2005, compared to $8,403,696 in 
government funding. See Advocacy, Inc., Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax (Form 990), at 1 (Feb. 21, 2007). 
152 While the majority of P&As are nonprofits that contract with states, some are 
independent administrative state agencies.  An interesting line of argument for those 
P&As that remain part of the state government emerges from the Supreme Court’s re-
cent opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, which holds that states are entitled to “special so-
licitude” when asserting claims in defense of their sovereign interests.  127 S. Ct. 1438, 
1454-55 (2007).  While a full exploration of this possibility is outside the scope of this 
Comment, it is important to note that conceiving of P&As as state entities quickly cre-
ates constitutional problems with the statutory grants of authority under PADD, 
PAIMI, and PAIR.  At least one defendant has unsuccessfully raised Fourth Amend-
ment search-and-seizure arguments to block a P&A from using its statutory grant of 
power to access psychiatric medical institution residents.  See Iowa Prot. & Advocacy 
Servs., Inc. v. Tanager Place, No. 04-0069, 2004 WL 2270002, at *14-16 (N.D. Iowa 
Sept. 30, 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s argument by reasoning that the Fourth 
Amendment was not applicable because the P&A was not an instrument or agent of 
the government).  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit never reached the issue because the 
case became moot.  Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Tanager, Inc., 427 F.3d 541, 543 
(8th Cir. 2005).  Because presumptive access rights are so central to the P&A statutory 
scheme, courts have interpreted the statutory scheme as creating P&As that are not 
state actors—and therefore not restricted by the Fourth Amendment—regardless of 
their location inside or outside state government, thus avoiding a constitutionally 
problematic reading of the P&As’ enabling statutes.  See Brief of Nat’l Ass’n of Prot. & 
Advocacy Sys., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Urging Affir-
mance at 15-17, Tanager, Inc., 427 F.3d 541 (No. 04-4074), 2005 WL 5628194 (listing 
the numerous situations in which courts have upheld P&As’ access authority without 
requiring warrants, implicitly drawing a distinction between P&As and government au-
thorities, which are subject to Fourth Amendment prohibitions).  This is consistent 
with the longstanding interpretive canon of avoidance.  See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, 
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The status of P&As as statutorily created entities is also relevant 
under Hunt.  The Advertising Commission was statutorily charged 
with promoting the Washington apple industry.153  While technically a 
state agency, the Commission “serve[d] a specialized segment of the 
State’s economic community which is the primary beneficiary of its ac-
tivities, including the prosecution of this kind of litigation.”154  Simi-
larly, P&As are created by statute to serve a “specialized segment” of 
the population—individuals with disabilities—and that segment is the 
“primary beneficiary” of their activities.155  Individuals with disabilities 
do not choose to join P&As, but neither did apple growers in Wash-
ington choose to join the Advertising Commission; in both cases, a 
statute created an organization that automatically represented the 
group’s interests.  It is absolutely clear under Hunt that the fact that 
individuals with disabilities do not choose to join the P&A, but rather 
are “automatic” constituents, is not dispositive. 
In Hunt, the Court rejected a formalistic application of the defini-
tion of “membership organization,” opting instead to analyze the 
structure of the Advertising Commission.  Each of the “indicia” that 
the Court highlighted demonstrated that the entire structure of the 
Commission was designed to tie it to the apple growers.  Many of these 
indicia could not be realistically applied to individuals with disabilities.  
Requiring individuals with disabilities to pay dues, like the members of 
the Commission, makes little sense when the organized population is 
not an economic entity.  Similarly, tying all membership changes to a 
vote by the disability community would be administratively difficult 
given the size of the constituency and a challenge given the cognitive 
barriers faced by many of its members.  Nevertheless, while P&As do 
not have the exact same indicia of membership as the Commission, 
they are statutorily structured to respond to the needs of individuals 
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that 
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided.”). 
153 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1977). 
154 Id. at 344. 
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 10801(b) (2000) (“The purposes of [PAIMI] are—(1) to ensure 
that the rights of individuals with mental illness are protected; and (2) to assist states to 
establish and operate a protection and advocacy system for individuals with mental ill-
ness which will—(A) protect and advocate for the rights of such individuals . . . and 
(B) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect . . . .”); id. § 15041 (“The purpose of 
[PADD] is to provide for allotments to support a protection and advocacy system . . . in 
each State to protect the legal and human rights of individuals with developmental 
disabilities . . . .”). 
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with disabilities, and they possess their own indicia of membership 
appropriate to the constituency they serve.  Like the Commission, 
P&As exist only because the legislature (in this case, federal rather 
than state) perceived a need for an entity that would advocate on be-
half of a certain group,156 and, as was true of the Commission, there 
are procedural safeguards and social pressures in place that ensure 
P&As are tightly connected to their members’ needs. 
The connection between P&As and the interests of individuals 
with disabilities is sufficient to satisfy the portion of the associational 
standing test that constitutes an “irreducible minimum” Article III re-
quirement.  Congress has structurally provided individuals with dis-
abilities a means of voicing their grievances:  they have a right to an 
appeals process, and P&As are politically and financially affected by 
the level of representation that they provide to those for whom they 
litigate.  P&As will still have to identify specific individuals who have 
been harmed and also demonstrate causation and redressability; those 
individuals will just be relieved of the obligation to join the lawsuit as 
plaintiffs.  Relief from that obligation is often vital to zealous litiga-
tion, as the pressures on individuals with disabilities not to speak out 
against rights violations can be significant.  As discussed in the next 
Section, Congress wisely recognized these pressures and took them 
into consideration in abrogating all prudential barriers to associa-
tional standing for P&As. 
B.  The Abrogation of Prudential Barriers:  The Role of Congress 
Congress clearly cannot abrogate the limitations of Article III.  
However, its judgment that a certain segment of the population needs 
special protection and advocacy should certainly be taken into consid-
eration when courts decide how to apply the prudential157 portions of 
156 See id. § 10801(a) (“The Congress finds that—(1) individuals with mental ill-
ness are vulnerable to abuse and serious injury; . . . (3) individuals with mental ill-
ness are subject to neglect, including lack of treatment, adequate nutrition, cloth-
ing, health care, and adequate discharge planning; and (4) State systems for 
monitoring compliance with respect to the rights of individuals with mental illness vary 
widely and are frequently inadequate.”).  In the case of P&As, this statutorily approved 
advocacy explicitly includes the power to litigate.  See supra notes 48-52 and accompa-
nying text. 
157 The term “prudential” is typically used in this context to describe the circum-
scription of the standing doctrine in a judicial attempt to bar the number of cases 
brought before the federal courts.  See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Lo-
cal 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (holding that the third prong 
of the associational standing test is prudential in that it is “best seen as focusing on . . . 
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the standing doctrine.  The Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
where the part of the standing inquiry at issue is prudential rather than 
constitutional (that is, where the Article III minimum has been satis-
fied), Congress can abrogate these prudential barriers to standing.158
In Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, the Ninth Circuit cited United Food 
& Commercial Workers Union v. Brown Group for the principle that while 
“the Constitution constrains Congress’ ability to confer standing, 
Congress can confer standing where the only obstacles are ‘judicially 
fashioned and prudentially imposed.’”159  The court went on to hold 
that the third prong of the Hunt associational standing test—the re-
quirement that “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit”160—is 
a prudential, not a constitutional, requirement, and as such could be 
abrogated by Congress.161  The Ninth Circuit then concluded that 
matters of administrative convenience and efficiency”).  Consequently, the term “pru-
dential” typically is tied to judicial efforts to avoid “flood-of-litigation” concerns.  While 
I use “prudential” in this narrow sense, some have argued that “prudential” ought to 
be understood as describing a concern for guarding against all “losses that qualify as 
disastrous.” See Edward F. McClennen, Prudence and Constitutional Rights, 63 AM. J.
ECON. & SOC. 213, 214-16 (2004) (arguing that preventing future losses is as much a 
part of prudential decision making as saving current costs or shoring up gains).  Un-
derstood this way, prudential decisions must take into account all relevant costs and 
benefits; certainly the risk of a flood of litigation will be part of the calculus, but so will 
the risk of societal harm if access to the courts is denied. 
158 See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“Con-
gress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art[icle] III, 
thus permitting litigation by one who otherwise would be barred by prudential stand-
ing rules.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (holding that the language of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3610(a), manifests Congress’s intent to “define standing as broadly as is permitted by 
Article III”); see also Dash T. Douglas, Standing on Shaky Ground:  Standing Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 34 AKRON L. REV. 613, 615 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court in Traf-
ficante recognized Congress’s power to eliminate all prudential barriers to standing, 
leaving only the Article III minimum); Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone:  Standing 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 60 MO. L. REV. 547, 556-61 (1995) (discussing Gladstone,
Trafficante, and the elimination of prudential standing requirements). 
159 Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union, 517 U.S. at 551, 558). 
160 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
161 Mink, 322 F.3d at 1113; see also, e.g., Joseph S. v. Hogan, No. 06-1042, 2008 WL 
2403698, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008) (holding that the organizations in question 
had associational standing “without regard to whether they meet Hunt’s third prong”); 
Haw. Disability Rights Ctr. v. Cheung, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1193 (D. Haw. 2007) 
(“Congress’s intent to permit a private right of action under a statute . . . could trump 
a court’s standing determination if made according to the prudential standing 
rule . . . .”); Access 4 All, Inc. v. Trump Int’l Hotel & Tower Condominium, 458 F. 
Supp. 2d 160, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The third prong of the Hunt test is not a con-
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“Congress clearly intended to confer standing” on P&As under PAIMI, 
and analogized the language of PAIMI to that of the statute at issue in 
United Food, finding that the similarities between the two laws sup-
ported the conclusion that Congress had effectively abrogated all pru-
dential barriers to associational standing for P&As in enacting PAIMI.162
The protection and advocacy system is not the only place where 
Congress has responded to a need for special advocate status.  Under 
the Fair Housing Act, Congress has made federal funds available for 
nonprofits designated “fair housing organizations” through the Fair 
Housing Initiatives program.163  The governing statute authorizes fair 
housing organizations to “obtain enforcement of the rights granted by 
title VIII [of the Civil Rights Act] . . . through such appropriate judi-
cial or administrative proceedings . . . as are available.”164  In Buckeye 
Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio upheld a fair housing organization’s standing in a “rep-
resentative capacity.”165  In Buckeye, two mothers of young children 
challenged the City of Cuyahoga’s decision to block construction of 
stitutional requirement, but a matter for prudential consideration.”).  Over the course 
of several decades, the Court has disentangled the three pieces of the associational 
standing test, indicating which are constitutional and which are prudential.  The first 
requirement of associational standing—that at least one of the organization’s members 
would have standing to sue in her own right—was the first to be clearly defined as a 
constitutional requirement.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).  The Court 
noted in United Food & Commercial Workers Union that, aside from the Warth holding re-
garding the first prong of the Hunt test, standing jurisprudence had not “clearly disen-
tangled the constitutional from the prudential strands of the associational standing 
test.” 517 U.S. 544, 555 (1996).  The Court went on to conclude that “[r]esort to gen-
eral principles . . . leads us to say that the associational standing test’s third prong is a 
prudential one.”  Id.  This left as uncategorized the second associational standing re-
quirement:  that the claim be germane to the organization’s purpose.  The court noted 
that this requirement is, 
at the least, complementary to the first, for its demand that an association 
plaintiff be organized for a purpose germane to the subject of its member’s 
claim raises an assurance that the association’s litigators will themselves have a 
stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as the 
defendant’s natural adversary. 
Id. at 555-56.  Thus, the Court has indicated that while the first and second prongs of 
the associational standing test form part of the Article III minimum requirements—
serving to ensure a tight connection between an organization and its members—the 
third prong can be eliminated through congressional action.
162 Mink, 322 F.3d at 1113. 
163 The Fair Housing Initiatives Program is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3616a (2000); its 
accompanying regulations are codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 125 (2008). 
164 42 U.S.C. § 3616a(a)(1). 
165 970 F. Supp. 1289, 1305-06 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
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an apartment complex in which they likely would have been eligible 
for subsidized housing.166  The local fair housing organization, Fair 
Housing Contract Service, sued on behalf of the women for injunctive 
relief.167  Despite the relatively loose connection between the women 
and Fair Housing Contract Service,168 the court determined the 
women were proper “members” of the organization for the purposes 
of associational standing.169  While the Supreme Court has not ruled 
directly on the associational standing of fair housing organizations 
under the FHA, in 1982, the Court found that such an agency had or-
ganizational standing in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.170  The agency 
in question, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), had sug-
gested in its brief that the Court did not need to rule on the question 
of associational standing and could instead decide only that HOME 
had standing to sue in its own right based on diversion of organiza-
tional funds.171  The Court agreed,172 and perhaps for this reason, no 
circuit courts of appeals have ruled on the question of whether fair 
housing organizations have associational standing to sue; the organi-
zations instead bring claims via organizational standing.  Still, strong 
parallels exist between the creation of fair housing organizations un-
der the FHA and the creation of P&As under PADD and PAIMI, and 
the reasoning employed by the court in Buckeye supports the conclu-
sions of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits. 
Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) has standing to intervene in any qualifying civil action 
brought by an aggrieved party against a nongovernmental em-
ployer.173  In Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport 
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., the Supreme Court referred to Con-
166 Id. at 1305. 
167 Id. at 1304-05. 
168 Both had voluntarily become members, but one testified that she “did not have 
to pay any dues [and did] not receive any of the newsletters,” and characterized her 
contact with the organization as “‘not a lot.’”  Id. at 1305.
169 Id.
170 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982). 
171 Id. at 379. 
172 Id. at 378-79. 
173 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (2000).  Admittedly, this is an imperfect analogy.  
The EEOC is a federal agency with standing to bring lawsuits directly on behalf of the 
federal government.  It does, however, provide another example of a congressional 
response to a situation where the typical citizen-as-plaintiff model would provide insuf-
ficient enforcement of individual rights. 
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gress’s explicit grant of standing to the EEOC.174  In Newport News, the 
Court mentioned the EEOC in a list of government agencies that have 
standing to intervene in certain civil actions based on clear statutory 
language.175  While agencies “normally do not have standing,” the 
Court affirmed Congress’s ability to grant that standing by “say[ing] 
so.”176  While there are clear differences between the EEOC and 
P&As—and between standing to sue and standing to intervene—both 
are statutorily created organizations with the power to advocate on 
behalf of aggrieved individuals.  Congress has clearly “said so” when it 
comes to P&A associational standing. 
Both housing and employment discrimination are particularly 
sticky issues for individual plaintiffs to tackle.  Victims are frequently 
poor, with little knowledge of the law, and the resources of an organi-
zation are often required to ascertain the existence of sufficient evi-
dentiary patterns.  Like the EEOC and the fair housing organizations, 
P&As are provided with federal funding to address the particular 
plight of a vulnerable group faced with an unwieldy and pervasive 
problem.  While Congress cannot statutorily circumvent the require-
ments of Article III, its judgment that a certain group needs an organ-
ized advocate with access to the courts ought to be respected so long 
as that advocating organization is structured and actually functions in 
a way that ensures the responsiveness and stake in the controversy 
prized by the Hunt indicia-of-membership test. 
P&As clearly can provide legal assistance to individuals with dis-
abilities who wish to become plaintiffs in suits to remedy rights viola-
tions.  The fact that this route to relief is available does not, however, 
eliminate the real need for P&A associational standing.  P&As, like 
other organizations, have the “pre-existing reservoir of expertise and 
capital” that the Supreme Court has referred to in upholding associa-
tional standing.177  In this way, P&As are like unions, trade associa-
tions, and nonprofit membership corporations—they provide the 
benefits of combined resources and prior experience, while allowing 
the injured individual to escape the burden of being the named plain-
tiff in the litigation.  But in the case of P&As, there is another reason 
to grant associational standing:  individuals with disabilities, especially 
those in residential facilities, are especially unlikely to challenge viola-
174 514 U.S. 122, 130 (1995). 
175 Id.
176 Id. at 129. 
177 UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986). 
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tions of their rights.  They are in the uncomfortable position of decid-
ing whether to sue the organization that cares for them each day.  
Understandably, even when serious rights violations have taken place, 
victims and their families may be reluctant to go on the offensive 
against such an organization.  Adding to this pressure, individuals with 
disabilities may have difficulty understanding that their rights have 
been violated in the first place.  A P&A with associational standing can 
carry the would-be plaintiff’s burden by representing the interests of 
the individual in court without requiring her to stand up and person-
ally accuse her caretakers.  Even when an individual with disabilities or 
that person’s family opposes litigation outright, P&As’ special access 
rights to records, facilities, and individuals may, under many circum-
stances, allow them to demonstrate concrete injury to individuals with 
disabilities.  Such a demonstration may occur even where the injured 
individuals are reluctant to join affirmatively in the litigation or au-
thorize its progress. 
This is the thorniest piece of the normative debate about allowing 
a prudential exception for P&A associational standing.  It is always 
controversial to say that an organization can represent an individual’s 
interests better than she can represent her own.  In the United States, 
there is a strong resistance to paternalism.178  For this reason, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court’s clear grant of associational standing to 
compulsory-membership organizations such as unions, some have sug-
gested that voluntary membership is the key to associational stand-
ing.179  Yet under Hunt, voluntary membership is not at the heart of 
associational standing.  In the case of individuals with disabilities, 
there are particularly compelling reasons not to require consent to 
litigation.  Both sides of the consent controversy are persuasive.180
178 Public health and safety issues provide evidence of this resistance.  See, e.g.,
David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill:  Critiquing Congress’s Response 
to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 372 (2007) (“Republicans’ appar-
ent resistance to government action on this issue illustrates a broader aversion to the 
paternalistic tendencies of the public-health community.”); cf. Elizabeth Cooper, Social 
Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law:  Lessons from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 869, 890 n.90, (2001) (noting the difficulties that governments have encountered 
in attempting to require individuals to wear motorcycle helmets or cut back on 
smoking).
179 See generally Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:  Perspectives on the “Case 
or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310-15 (1979) (presenting a self-
determination approach to standing that argues that “persons should not be able to 
assert the rights of others even assuming they are good representatives”). 
180 For a contemporary illustration, consider Ricci v. Okin, currently before the 
federal district court in Massachusetts.  No. 72-0469 (D. Mass.).  In 1993, a court ter-
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Those who argue that P&As should not be able to sue “on behalf of” 
individuals with disabilities without the consent of those individuals or 
their families correctly note that, for years, the states’ power to make 
decisions on behalf of individuals with disabilities landed them in the 
squalor of places like Willowbrook.  However, to require affirmative 
consent in all situations, either from individuals or from their parents 
or guardians, also represents a value choice—one that may ignore the 
complex power dynamics in a given situation.181  Congress’s passage of 
PADD, PAIMI, and PAIR reflects the reality that individuals with dis-
abilities are a unique population.  These individuals face major cogni-
tive and social barriers to effective self-advocacy.  As one court noted 
in striking down limitations on P&A access to individuals with disabili-
ties, the mentally ill are a uniquely vulnerable population: 
minated twenty-one years of federal court oversight of mental health institutions in the 
state.  Ricci v. Okin, 823 F. Supp. 984, 985 (D. Mass. 1993).  The order terminating 
oversight stipulated that the state would not approve “a transfer of any class mem-
ber . . . into the community” without “certifi[cation] that the individual . . . will receive 
equal or better services to meet their needs in the new location.”  Id. at 987 (emphasis 
added).  In 2003, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts attempted to close six mental 
health facilities and transition the residents of those facilities into the community.  Cf.
Amicus Brief in Response to Report of Court-Appointed Monitor at 2, Ricci v. Okin, 
499 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2007) (No. 72-0469) (showing the support of amici dis-
ability-rights groups for transitioning residents into “community-based settings”).  The 
push to close the facilities set off a storm of controversy in the disabilities world, pitting 
families against national disability-rights groups.  Families argued that consent should 
be required before transfer—consent that often comes via family members because the 
individual in question cannot speak or write.  See, e.g., Emily Sweeney, Test of Wills at 
Fernald:  Families Refusing to Let Patients Move, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1.  A 
coalition of national disability-rights groups responded that individuals with disabili-
ties, in the end, gain more autonomy when the state is allowed to override consent and 
close down outdated, large facilities in favor of community integration.  See Amicus 
Brief in Response to Report of Court-Appointed Monitor, supra, at 19 (arguing that the 
shift “from institutional settings to community-based settings . . . has had a profoundly 
positive impact on the lives of . . . people with intellectual disabilities”). 
181 The complexity of the dilemma is highlighted by the Administration on Devel-
opmental Disabilities’ recent proposed amendments to PADD regulations.  Develop-
mental Disabilities Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,708 (proposed Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. pts. 1385–1388).  The proposed amendments included an invitation 
for public comment on whether P&As must obtain consent of the parent or guardian 
where an individual P&A constituent wishes to participate in a class action. Id. at 
19,709.  In their comments to the regulations, the National Disability Rights Network 
opposed any consent requirement, arguing that the proposal of such a requirement 
fundamentally misunderstands the nature and purpose of class actions.  See Letter 
from Curtis L. Decker, Executive Dir., Nat’l Disability Rights Network, to Patricia A. 
Morrissey, Comm’r, Admin. on Developmental Disabilities, Admin. for Children and 
Families, supra note 7, at 38-39 (contesting the Administration on Developmental Dis-
abilities’ statement that informed consent is a “cornerstone” of class action suits). 
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 The mentally ill are vulnerable to abuse and neglect because many 
mentally ill individuals have difficulty recognizing the concept that they 
have rights and will not necessarily identify even the most egregious 
abuse as a violation of their rights . . . . 
 . . . . 
 Furthermore, residents who are willing to initiate such a call are apt 
to be deterred if facilities for making a private call are not available or if 
the nature of the call must be revealed to the institution’s staff in order 
to gain access to a private phone.  Many institutionalized residents are 
reluctant or afraid to take actions that might incur the displeasure of 
staff who control nearly every aspect of their daily life.
182
Any analysis of the “big picture” importance of P&As’ rights and 
responsibilities must be undertaken with the knowledge that the DD 
Act was passed in the shadow of Willowbrook.183  People with disabili-
ties have been the victims of pervasive and systemic discrimination re-
sulting in horrific treatment.184  For decades, this country’s policy for 
dealing with disability and mental illness was segregation or institu-
tionalization far from the public eye.185  Inside these institutions, hu-
man beings were abused, neglected, and experimented upon.186  This 
isolation was exacerbated by the courts’ unwillingness to respond to 
the harms to those affected: 
In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the forced sterilization of a 
woman whose mother and daughter were both mentally retarded.  Peo-
ple with mental disabilities were, the Court said, a “menace” who “sap 
the strength of the state.”  Society would be wise to “prevent those who 
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . . . . Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough.”
187
182 Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D.N.M. 1990). 
183 See Nat’l Disabilities Rights Network—History, http://www.ndrn.org/aboutus/ 
history.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (“The Protection and Advocacy concept was ini-
tially triggered by . . . investigative reporting [that] exposed abuse, neglect and lack of 
programming at Willowbrook . . . .”); supra text accompanying notes 22-26. 
184 See generally ACLU, Disability Rights—ACLU Position/Briefing Paper (Jan. 1, 
1999), http://www.aclu.org/disability/gen/10648pub19990101.html.  Recognition of 
this tragic history is not new.  See RICHARD C. ALLEN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED 
AND DISADVANTAGED 2-3 (1969) (recognizing the “catalog of horrors” that is character-
istic of the mistreatment of individuals with disabilities). 
185 For example, Hawaii’s leper colonies were maintained into the 1950s.  See
ACLU, supra note 184. 
186 See Bowman, supra note 22, at 959 (describing witness accounts of residents at 
Willowbrook being beaten and purposely exposed to hepatitis). 
187 ACLU, supra note 184 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927)). 
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Responding to this history, PAIMI begins with congressional findings 
that “individuals with mental illness are vulnerable to abuse and seri-
ous injury . . . [and] are subject to neglect, including lack of treat-
ment, adequate nutrition, clothing, health care, and adequate dis-
charge planning.”188  These conditions may be particularly difficult to 
discover if residents feel pressure not to speak out. 
It is difficult to gauge the effect of institutional pressures on indi-
viduals in residential situations because the more effective the pres-
sure, the fewer complaints will be heard.  Scientific studies in a variety 
of settings demonstrate, however, that residential settings often sys-
tematically discourage dissent and that reluctance to challenge a prac-
tice does not necessarily indicate acquiescence.189  One such study also 
indicates that “the longer [individuals have been] in a care home, the 
less likely they [are] to complain.”190
The autonomy-consent problem has been hotly debated in the 
disability world, where advocates must balance the development of 
programs that act on behalf of individuals with disabilities against the 
dangers of paternalism.191  This is an important issue, and I do not 
wish to imply otherwise.  In this case, however, the risk of harm in the 
form of unaddressed rights violations if consent is required outweighs 
the risk of paternalistic abuse by P&As.  At the very least, there is 
strong evidence that the failure of individuals with disabilities willingly 
to become plaintiffs in a lawsuit does not mean that rights violations 
are not taking place.  Whatever else the standing requirement is de-
188 42 U.S.C. § 10801(a)(1), (3) (2000). 
189 See, e.g., Stephen Abbott et al., Social and Democratic Participation in Residential 
Settings for Older People:  Realities and Aspirations, 20 AGEING & SOC’Y 327, 335-36 (2000) 
(documenting the general feeling of elderly residents of a nursing home that they 
could not complain to staff about conditions); Mordecai Arieli, Knowledge and Educa-
tional Contexts:  Some Intercultural and Intergenerational Notes, 29 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 
153, 154 (2000) (reporting that a previous study found that in residential school set-
tings, students who avoid challenging what they are taught are more likely to be aca-
demically successful); Michael Preston-Shoot, A Triumph of Hope over Experience?  Mod-
ernizing Accountability:  The Case of Complaints Procedures in Community Care, 35 SOC. POL’Y
& ADMIN. 701, 701-02 (2001) (acknowledging that while complaint procedures are a 
key part of fighting abuse in homes for children, the elderly, and individuals with dis-
abilities, such procedures are often unsatisfactory in uncovering problems because 
they fail to shift the fundamental organizational-individual balance of power in a sig-
nificant way). 
190 Preston-Shoot, supra note 189, at 703. 
191 See, e.g., D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother’s Keeper:  Disabilities, Paternalism, and 
Threats to Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 56-57 (2003) (criticizing legislation, ostensi-
bly for the protection of individuals with disabilities, allowing employers to fire those 
individuals from dangerous jobs for their own safety). 
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signed to do, it should not prevent legitimate rights violations from 
being remedied in court.  The pressure not to speak up in residential 
settings is well documented and understandably powerful.  Procedural 
safeguards designed to give individuals with disabilities a voice in 
P&As’ activities are vital, but hinging all litigation on a consenting in-
dividual plaintiff may lead us back down the path to Willowbrook.  In-
dividuals with disabilities need advocates.  P&As were created to serve 
as those advocates, and it is important that they be allowed to speak 
for their constituents in court. 
The fact that Congress has squarely faced this difficult issue in 
creating statutorily authorized, federally funded advocates connects to 
the separation-of-powers values that the standing doctrine is designed 
to protect.192  Congress, not the courts, is the expert on making policy 
determinations by weighing evidence.193  So long as the minimum 
constitutional requirements are met, Congress’s decision to vest P&As 
with the authority to sue on behalf of members with disabilities is enti-
tled to deference. 
The statutory language granting P&As the right to sue on behalf 
of their members is very specific.  PADD and PAIMI explicitly author-
ize P&As to pursue legal remedies on behalf of their members.194  In 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Court found “broad 
and inclusive” language in the Fair Housing Act to be sufficient to ab-
rogate prudential standing requirements and noted that the Act 
granted standing to sue to anyone in an apartment complex where a 
person had been the object of discriminatory housing practices.195
Congressional intent to grant P&As the ability to sue on behalf of in-
dividuals with disabilities under PADD and PAIMI is just as clear as the 
intent to allow any resident of an apartment complex where housing 
discrimination is a problem to sue.  Under the plain language of 
192 See supra Part II. 
193 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (noting that 
certain policy issues are best resolved by Congress and are not amenable to judicial 
resolution); cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC., 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997) (“The Consti-
tution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative 
process.  Even when the resulting regulation touches on First Amendment concerns, 
we must give considerable deference . . . to Congress’ findings . . . .”).
194 42 U.S.C. §§ 10805(a)(1), 15043(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
195 See 409 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972) (“The definition of ‘person aggrieved’ con-
tained in [the statute] is in terms broad, as it is defined as ‘(a)ny person who claims to 
have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.’” (quoting Fair Housing Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 73, 85 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) 
(2000)))).
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PADD and PAIMI, the third prong of the associational standing test 
has been eliminated for P&As. 
CONCLUSION
Hunt rejected a formalistic application of the test for associational 
standing in favor of a substantive inquiry into both the relationship 
between the organization and its members and the individual and so-
cietal values served by granting that organization standing.  Overly 
formalistic application can yield unjust results, as the Court reminded 
us in Hunt.196  Formalistic application of rules should always be fol-
lowed by consideration of the meaning underlying constitutional 
provisions. 
The four courts of appeals to address the issue each undertook 
the first and most important piece of the associational standing analy-
sis, asking whether the connection between individuals with disabili-
ties and P&As is sufficient to ensure the kind of zealous litigation con-
stitutionally required by Article III’s “case” or “controversy” language.  
The Ninth Circuit in particular explored the procedural safeguards in 
place to hold P&As accountable to individuals with disabilities in the 
state.  But when the inquiry is limited to plugging new pieces of in-
formation into the Hunt fact pattern, it is difficult to know how the 
analysis ought to come out.  A cursory analysis of the problem under 
Hunt’s indicia-of-membership test yields inconsistent results because 
Hunt does not tell us which indicia are mandatory or how to weigh the 
indicia against one another. 
The Hunt test should be viewed as part of an analysis designed to 
get at the twin underlying goals of standing:  first, that disputes before 
the federal courts will be between parties with real interests at stake 
and so will be genuine Article III cases or controversies, and second, 
that associational standing is granted where the application of typical 
prudential limitations runs the risk that true rights violations will go 
unaddressed.  The Supreme Court has recognized that organizations 
ought to be able to sue on behalf of their members.  Numerous politi-
196 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1977); see also
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985) (contending that 
“practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories 
should inform application of Article III”).  See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitu-
tional Calcification:  How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1713 
(2005) (arguing that the Court itself sometimes confuses “decision rules” with the ac-
tual meaning of the Constitution).
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cal and procedural safeguards ensure P&As will zealously represent 
the interests of their constituents.  Congress has affirmatively stepped 
in to abrogate all prudential barriers to P&A standing.  In addition, 
denying P&As the right to litigate on behalf of these constituents cre-
ates a very real danger that rights violations will persist unchecked.  
P&As are precisely the sort of organization that ought to qualify for 
associational standing. 
